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Malpractice Hazards in Dental Extractions
SCOPE AND JUSTIFICATION
The subject of dental malpractice as a unit of study and analysis has
been neglected by writers on the law.' The author believes that they
have done so without justification. Although the authorities are in agree-
ment that the legal rules applicable to cases of malpractice involving phy-
sicians and non-oral surgeons are the same as those which apply to
dentists,2 the fact situations involved in the dental area are bound to be
more or less unique. The dentist operates upon a single, relatively small
body cavity, with little room in which to maneuver. The nature of the
operative area creates a significant likelihood of hazardous mistakes, both
in treatment and in diagnosis. Perhaps the most cogent reason for
separate consideration of dental malpractice cases, however, is the same
one that permits such independent study of the doctor-patient relation-
ship: there are problems which are peculiar to each profession.
The author has sought to contain this note within the realm of dental
extractions because it is the most convenient unit of study and analysis
in the entire, rather broad field of dental malpractice. There are two
reasons for this convenience. The first rests upon the conception that
an extraction for jurisprudential purposes should not be regarded as
comprehending the mere act of forcefully withdrawing the tooth from
its socket and nothing more. When an extraction is considered from
diagnosis to post-operative treatment, and even beyond (such as, for
example, failure to inform the patient that a root has been left in the
gum), a considerable portion of the dentist's routine will be subjected to
scrutiny. The second reason for limitation of this study to the extraction
milieu is a highly practical one: a vast majority of the lawsuits in which
dentists appear as defendants are founded upon some aspect of the ex-
traction process. The suits not covered in this note (such as those involv-
ing the filling of cavities or the adjustment of dental plates) will not
only be insignificant in number, but will almost without exception give
rise to such small damages (if any) as to make settlement's advisability
axiomatic.
THE STANDARD OF CARE
The courts have generally regarded a suit for dental malpractice as
being an ordinary negligence action? Although many judges still speak
1. For extensive but not profound case notes on the subject of dental malpractice, see Annot.,
129 A.L.R. 101 (1940); Annot., 69 A.L.R. 1142 (1930); Annot, Ann. Cas. 1918 C 1190;
Annot, Ann. Cas. 1914 A 273.
2. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THm I.Aw 458 (3d ed. 1956).
3. CARNAHAN, THE DITsT AND Tim LAW § 80, at 121 (1955); REGAN, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 17, 30.
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of an "implied contract"' between dentist and patient by the terms of
which the dentist agrees to perform only the work specified and to do it
skillfully, and the patient agrees to co-operate and to compensate, there
is no doubt that the action sounds in tort, regardless of any allegation of
the "contract" in the pleading.' Insofar as substantive rules of law are
concerned, "malpractice" has become nearly synonymous with negli-
gence,6 which means that the first consideration of this study should be
the duty of the dentist to his patient.
Formulating the Standard
The terms in which the standard of care has been formulated often
conflict and occasionally overlap. Some opinions say that the dentist
must possess and exercise the care, skill, and learning possessed by practi-
tioners of dentistry in the same community7 or in a community similar to
that in which the defendant dentist practices.8 Others hold that what is
done in a similar community may not be considered by the jury.' Some
courts restrict the dentist's duty to the standard of care in his general
neighborhood.1" A few add to the formula the contemporary state of
dental science." Many limit the standard to what is done by dentists of
good standing under circumstances similar to those which existed in the
case at bar.'" For all this variation, however, there is little effect on
the outcome of cases by a change in the formula. The jury would not
be likely to notice the alteration in meaning if a different statement of
the dentist's duty were propounded to them by the court. Only when
a neighborhood or town has a peculiar professional custom (such as a
specified numerical limitation on the number of teeth that may be ex-
tracted at one sitting) 3 does it make any difference whether the stand-
4. See Nance v. Beatie, 127 Kan. 505, 507, 274 Pac. 219-20 (1929); Goodlet v. Wil-
liamston, 179 Okla. 238, 239, 65 P.2d 472, 474 (1936).
5. See Patterson v. Howe, 102 Ore. 275, 202 Pac. 225 (1921).
6. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
7. See Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 308, 30 P.2d 259, 262 (1934); Staples v. Washing-
ton, 125 A.2d 322 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1956); Tanner v. Sanders, 247 Ky. 90, 56 S.W.2d
718 (1933); Mitchell v. Poole, 229 Mo. App. 1, 13, 68 S.W.2d 833, 839 (1934).
8. See Hill v. Jackson, 218 Mo. App. 210, 216, 265 S.W. 859, 861 (1924); Malila v.
Meacham, 187 Ore. 330, 335-36, 211 P.2d 747, 749-50 (1949); Alexander v. Hill, 174 Va.
248, 252, 6 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1940).
9. See Tanner v. Sanders, 247 Ky. 90, 56 S.W.2d 718 (1933); Mitchell v. Poole, 229 Mo.
App. 1, 13, 68 S.W.2d 833, 839 (1934).
10. See McTyeire v. McGaughy, 222 Ala. 100, 130 So. 784-85 (1930); Hurley v. Johnston,
143 Conn. 364, 122 A.2d 732 (1956); Dolan v. O'Rouke, 56 N.D. 416, 420, 217 N.W.
666, 667 (1928).
11. See Lindloff v. Ross, 208 Wis. 482, 487, 243 N.W. 403, 405 (1932).
12. See Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618, 623, 73 So. 2d 781, 782 (1954);
Pollack v. Dussourd, 158 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1947) (Ohio law).
13. See Voss v. Adams, 271 Mich. 203, 259 N.W. 889 (1935).
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ard is that of the defendant's community or that of "the same or a simi-
lar community" ("similar" evidently referring to population and to ur-
ban-rural proportion and development)." The dentist is not and should
not be, for the sake of the advancement of the dental science, required
to take a poll of his fellow-practitioners and then zealously to follow the
dictates of a bare majority of the dentists in his community as to how
a particular dental problem should be treated. There is no liability for
carefully adhering to the theory of a respectable minority. 5 At least
one jurisdiction, moreover, recognizes that the standards of dentists in a
like or the same community may be unreasonably low. What other mem-
bers of the profession do is, therefore, only evidence to be considered by
the jury and to be weighed along with their own concepts of reasonable
conduct under a given set of circumstances.' 6
Errors of Judgment
Although the cases are filled with platitudes to delight the ears of the
unwary, that a dentist is not responsible for a "mere error of judgment,' '
there is very little room for such mistakes.' 8 In general, when the court
says that the defendant was guilty of an error of judgment for which he
is not liable, it is usually expressing a conclusion that there was no negli-
gence - no violation of the standard of care - on which liability could
be founded. A further limitation on the possibility of an error of judg-
ment precluding liability is the distinction made between a mistaken
diagnosis and an erroneously chosen or negligently performed operative
procedure. Although both are actually mistakes of judgment (most
clearly the error of choice in operative procedure is), there is no liability
for the former and liability for the latter.'" It is the mistaken diagnosis
which is usually labeled a "mere error of judgment.""0  If the diagnosis is
correct, and if the authorities are in conflict as to the proper procedure
to be followed, the question of negligence is for the jury.2 ' To narrow
the safety zone even further, it has been held that when the diagnostic
14. See Tanner v. Sanders, 247 Ky. 90, 56 S.W.2d 718 (1933).
15. Moscicki v. Shot, 107 Pa. Super. 192, 200, 163 Ad. 341, 343 (1932).
16. Ribarin v. Kessler, 78 Ohio App. 289, 293-94, 70 N.E.2d 107, 110 (1946).
17. See, e.g., Phillips v. Stillwell, 55 Ariz. 147, 149, 99 P.2d 104 (1940); Preston v. Hub-
bell, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 56, 196 P.2d 113, 114-15 (1948) (dictum); Burdge v. Errickson,
132 N.J.L. 377, 40 A.2d 573 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945).
18. See CARNAHAN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 85.
19. See Walter v. England, 133 Cal. App. 676, 686-87, 24 P.2d 930, 934 (1933); Rising
v. Veatch, 117 Cal. App. 404, 409, 3 P.2d 1023, 1025 (1931); Specht v. Gaines, 65 Ga.
App. 782, 784, 16 S.E.2d 507, 509 (1941); Zulkiwsky v. Greenblat, 14 N.J. Misc. 345, 184
Ad. 806 (Sup. Ct. 1936), affd per curiam, 117 NJ.L. 526, 189 Atl. 51 (Ct. Err. & App.
1937); Love v. Zimmerman, 226 N.C. 389, 38 S.E.2d 220 (1946); Ogle v. Noe, 6 Tenn.
App. 485 (1927).
20. But see Hazelwood v. Adams, 245 N.C. 398, 95 S.E.2d 917 (1957).
21. Malila v. Meacham, 187 Ore. 330, 355-59, 211 P.2d 747, 758-59 (1949).
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error is "gross," there is negligence for which the dentist is responsible.=2
There is, indeed, little room for error of judgment.
The Standard for Specialists
A specialist is held to the standard of other professionals practicing in
the same specialized area in the same or in a similar community.2 Just as
a general practitioner may not be required to possess and exercise the
skill and learning of an exodontist (or extraction expert)," an exodontist
must use the superior skill and learning which he holds himself out to
the public as possessing. Although the standard of the specialist is there-
fore higher than that of the general practitioner, actual results may, it
seems, seldom correspond to this theory. This observation is derived
from the frequent reiteration and application of the rule that the dentist
need not exercise the highest degree of care and skill, but only that de-
gree ordinarily accepted as part of the "duty formula" in that particular
jurisdiction.25 It makes no difference whether the dentist has the highest
degree of skill; he nevertheless needs to employ but ordinary skill.26 It
seems that in the present advanced state of dental science, it is sufficiently
difficult for a jury to distinguish the ordinary skill of a specialist (and
especially of an exodontist, since the general practitioner handles many
extractions) that when a jury is instructed that a dentist need not exercise
his full capabilities, but only those ordinarily possessed by other special-
ists, the jury is likely to reach the same result it would have reached
had a general practitioner been the defendant.
APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD
For a proper understanding of the dentist's legal duty, under the
hazards of extraction, a study must be made of how the standard is ap-
plied to certain typical recurring problems.
Anesthetization
Expert testimony has managed to convince most courts that have con-
sidered the problem, that a hypodermic needle may break off in the pa-
22. Mangiameli v. Ariano, 126 Neb. 629, 253 N.W. 871 (1934).
23. See Stallcup v. Coscarat, 79 Ariz. 42, 50-51, 282 P.2d 791, 797 (1955); Chubb v.
Holmes, 111 Conn. 482, 488-89, 150 At. 516, 519 (1930); Eatley v. Meyer, 10 N.J. Misc.
219, 221, 158 Atl. 411 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Malila v. Meacham, 187 Ore. 330, 335-36, 211
P.2d 747, 749-50 (1949).
24. Tennenbaum v. Klein, 252 App. Div. 796, 299 N.Y. Supp. 119 (2d Dep't 1937).
25. Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618, 623, 73 So.2d 781, 782 (1954);
Alexander v. Hill, 174 Va. 248, 252, 6 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1940). But see Keily v. Colton,
1 City Ct. Rep. 439, 441 (N.Y. Marine Ct. 1882), where the court, speaking of the dentist,
who dropped an extracted tooth down an anesthetized patient's throat, said: "He [the patient]
was in their charge and under their control to such an extent that they were required to exer-
cise the highest professional skill and diligence to avoid every possible danger, for the law
imposes duties upon men according to the circumstances in which they are called to act.'
26. Acton v. Morrison, 62 Ariz. 139, 142, 155 P.2d 782, 783 (1945).
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dent's jaw no matter how careful the dentist is.2" After all, the dentist
does not manufacture the needle; and if he carefully uses a needle which
is made by a reputable manufacturer and which does not show signs of
possible weakness, he should not be held liable for its breaking off. One
court, however, has held that an inference of negligence is raised by the
breaking off of the needle, the court invoking the ratiocination that if
the breaking off of needles were a common experience among dentists,
they would find another method of local anesthetization."
The same standard that applies to other aspects of the dentist's profes-
sional conduct governs the administration of general anesthetics.29 If
the dentist is aware that the patient is under a physician's care for a con-
dition which contra-indicates the use of a general anesthetic, he should
not administer it. To avoid risk, it is best to inquire of the patient's phy-
sician when there is any indication of a condition to which the adminis-
tration of a general anesthetic would be inimical." It would be foolish
for a dentist to lean very heavily on the sleep-inducing statement of the
Superior Court of Delaware that "the mere fact that a patient dies under
the influence of an anesthetic does not show negligence."'" It may take
little more than death to take the case from a sympathetic judge to a
sympathetic jury.
Using the Tools of the Trade
The utmost care should be taken by a dentist to be certain that a piece
of burr (a cutting tool) or elevator (a device used to pry the tooth from
the socket) is not broken off or allowed to remain in the patient's gum.82
To break off the instrument is not necessarily negligence;8" to fail to dis-
cover that it has been broken, or to be sure that the patient does not leave
the office with a piece of metal in his gums will be negligence.84 The
danger of allowing an instrument accidentally to come into contact with
a loose tooth should be dear. It has been held, however, that it is not
necessary to pre-examine teeth before inserting an instrument into the
patient's mouth.8"
27. See Ernen v. Crofwell, 272 Mass. 172, 175, 172 N.E. 73, 74 (1930); Mitchell v. Poole,
229 Mo. App. 1, 12-13, 68 S.W.2d 833, 838-39 (1934); Smith v. McClung, 201 N.C. 648,
161 SYE. 91 (1931).
28. Alonzo v. Rogers, 155 Wash. 206, 210-12, 283 Pac. 709, 710-11 (1930).
29. Harris v. Wood, 214 Minn. 492, 498, 8 N.W.2d 818, 821 (1943).
30. See CARNAHAN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 93.
31. Mitchell v. Atkins, 36 Del. (6 W. W. Harr.) 451, 455, 178 At. 593, 595 (Super. Ct.
1935).
32. See Fairley v. Douglas, 76 So. 2d 576, 580 (La. Ct. App. 1955); Percifield v. Foutz,
71 Nev. 220, 285 P.2d 130 (1955).
33. Giesenschlag v. Valenta, 225 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1949).
34. Cases cited note 32 supra.
35. Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618, 629, 73 So. 2d 781, 784 (1954).
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Leaving a Root in the Gum
An extracted tooth is usually decayed. When force is applied to it
in the process of extraction, it is so natural and common for the tooth
to break off at the gumline that the dentist cannot be held negligent
merely for breaking off the crown; 6 but it may be negligence to allow
a root to remain in the patient's mouth and to cause difficulty.3 It also
may be negligence not to be aware of the fact that a root tip remains,"
and though it may not be negligence to fail to x-ray the jaw after an
extraction to determine whether it remains,39 this is one of the many in-
stances in which the timely and accurate use of x rays will save a dentist
the embarrassment and inconvenience of a lawsuit.
The Tooth in the Windpipe
One type of dental malpractice case in which the fact situations closely
resemble one another is that in which an extracted tooth falls down the
patient's throat and lodges in the bronchial tubes. Typically, the patient
has a heavy feeling in his chest after the operation. He then suffers
severe pain and violent coughing spells, emitting blood and sputum
in large quantities. He undergoes several examinations which bear no
diagnostic fruit, and then one day, after a particularly violent fit of
coughing, the tooth or a portion of it is expelled, and the patient begins
to recover.4" The authorities are in conflict as to whether res ipsa
loquitur can be applied to establish negligence in such cases,4' although
it is clearly negligence not to use throat packs to avoid such occurrences.
42
The Broken Jaw
No inference of negligence arises when the patient's jaw is broken
during an extraction, but a jury might well consider it along with other
evidence of negligence.43 It is certainly negligence not to reveal the
36. Brashears v. Peak, 19 So. 2d 901, 903 (La. Ct. App. 1944); Staples v. Washington, 125
A.2d 322 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1956).
37. See Blakeslee v. Tannelund, 25 Cal. App. 2d 32, 76 P.2d 216 (1938); Perrin v. Rodri-
guez, 153 So. 555, 557 (La. Ct. App. 1934); Hazelwood v. Adams, 245 N.C. 398, 95 S&E.2d
917 (1957); Love v. Zimmerman, 226 N.C. 389, 38 S.E.2d 220 (1946).
38. See ibid.
39. See Brashears v. Peak, 19 So. 2d 901, 904 (La. Ct. App. 1944).
40. See, e.g., Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539, 173 N.E. 670 (1930); Toy v. Mackin-
tosh, 222 Mass. 430, 110 N.E. 1034 (1916); Keily v. Colton, 1 City Ct. Rep. 439 (N.Y.
Marine Ct. 1882); Goehring v. McDiarmid, 289 Pa. 193, 137 Atl. 187 (1927) (per curiam).
41. Compare Keily v. Colton, 1 City Ct. Rep. 439, 441-42 (N.Y. Marine Ct. 1882), with
Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 111. 539, 544, 173 N.E. 670, 672 (1930). See also notes
88-93, 98 infra and accompanying text.
42. Yarrington v. Pittenger, 8 N.J. Misc. 143, 149 Atl. 347 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (per curiam).
43. Ogle v. Noe, 6 Tenn. App. 485, 489-90 (1927).
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fracture to the patient." Treatment of the fracture should be attended to
immediately and adequately, and even the general practitioner is expected
to set the fracture properly.45  "tT]reatment in such cases is almost a
matter of common knowledge.,
46
Infection
In cases of infection the dentist can avoid successful suits by purging
himself of any possible ground for an allegation that his instruments
were not sterile. Any indication of infection after the operation should
be treated immediately." The courts recognize that the dentist is pri-
marily an office practitioner and normally cannot be expected to treat his
patients in their homes, but on receiving information in his office which
should lead to suspicion of infection, it would be wise to have the patient
sent to a doctor or to a hospital.48 Res ipsa loquitur has not been applied
to cases of infection.4"
The Use of X rays
Of course, one who holds himself out as a specialist in the taking of
x rays will be held liable for faulty diagnosis based on negligently taken
x rays. " The general practitioner, however, is not held to the standard
of anyone but another general practictioner insofar as is concerned the
quality of the x ray upon which he bases his diagnosis. " To show that
the dentist might have produced a better result had he taken an x ray is
not a sufficient establishment of proximate causation to send the case to
the jury." Taking an x ray both before and after the operation is, never-
theless, an excellent way to avoid complications that lead to the initiation
of irksome (though often unsuccessful) legal embroilments.
Emergencies - Post-operative Care
Emergencies occurring during and after treatment should be cared for
in the office in order to avoid the liability that may follow from the
44. Shutan v. Bloomenthal, 371 Ill. 244, 20 N.E.2d 570 (1939); Wambold v. Brock, 236
Iowa 758, 763-64, 19 N.W.2d 582, 584-85 (1945).
45. Preston v. Hubbell, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 57-60, 196 P.2d 113, 115-16 (1948) (dic-
rum); Wambold v. Brock, 236 Iowa 758, 763-64, 19 N.W.2d 582, 584-85 (1945).
46. Id. at 762, 19 N.W.2d at 584.
47. See Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal. App. 404, 3 P.2d 1023 (1931); Specht v. Gaines, 65
Ga. App. 782, 16 S.E.2d 507 (1941).
48. See cases dted note 47 supra.
49. See Haliburton v. General Hosp. Soc., 133 Conn. 61, 48 A.2d 261 (1946).
50. Barley v. Meyer, 10 N.J. Misc. 219, 221, 158 Adt. 411 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
51. See Rawleigh v. Donoho, 238 Ky. 480, 482, 38 S.W.2d 227-28 (1931).
52. Dunbar v. Adams, 283 Mich. 48, 276 N.W. 895 (1937).
53. See Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206, 212, 291 Pac. 173, 175-76 (1930); Preston v.
Hubbell, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 57-60, 196 P.2d 113, 115-16 (1948) (dictum); Hill v. Jack-
son, 218 Mo. App. 210, 216-17, 265 S.W. 859, 862 (1924); Donathan v. McConnell, 121
Mont. 230, 243-44, 193 P.2d 819, 826 (1948).
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untoward results of lack of prompt treatment. Profuse bleeding may not
safely be regarded as a natural concomitant of extraction. The wise
dentist will not let his patient leave the office until he is certain that
hemorrhaging is well under control.54 A careful examination of the pa-
tient's mouth ought to follow any extraction.55 If the patient is under
general anesthesia and an emergency arises which requires prompt treat-
ment to preserve life or health, the law does not expect the dentist to
awaken the patient, explain to him the emergency, obtain consent to per-
form the necessary additional acts which will remove the danger, and
then re-anesthetize the patient.56 Emergency treatment is as much a part
of the operation to which the patient consented as the extraction itself.5 7
A real dilemma for the dentist is indicated by Brigadier General Neal A.
Harper, who says that emergencies may require bold and imaginative
treatment, but that experimentation and untried remedies will not be per-
mitted without the patient's consent, which, in an emergency, cannot pos-
sibly be obtained. 8 The only solution to the dilemma seems to be for
the dentist to acquaint himself with the accepted methods of treatment of
various emergencies.
Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence is seldom alleged in a dental malpractice suit.
There is little opportunity for negligence on the patient's part during the
extraction; there is none when he is under a general anesthetic. If, how-
ever, the patient refuses to co-operate with the dentist by following his in-
structions regarding post-operative care, the patient runs a distinct risk of
losing any cause of action he may have had against the dentist.59 When
a patient suffered osteomyelitis from a root left in her mouth after extrac-
tion, it was held as a matter of law that the patient could not recover
because (among other reasons) her damages followed failure to return
the next day as the dentist had requested.6"
54. Harper, Legal Aspects of Emergency Treatment, DENTAL CLINICS OF NORTH AMmtcA,
SYMPOSrUM ON EMPRGENCIES N DENTAL PRAcricE 593, 594 (July, 1957).
55. See Burch v. Greenwald, 247 App. Div. 471, 286 N.Y. Supp. 661 (4th Dep't 1936).
56. See Preston v. Hubbell, 87 Cal. App.2d 53, 57-60, 196 P.2d 113, 115-16 (1948)
(dictum).
57. Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206, 212, 291 Pac. 173, 175-76 (1930); Preston v. Hub-
bell, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 57-60, 196 P.2d 113, 115-16 (1948) (dictum).
58. Harper, supra note 54, at 597.
59. See Gentile v. De Virgilis, 290 Pa. 50, 138 At. 540 (1927); cf. Tanner v. Sanders,
247 Ky. 90, 97, 56 S.W.2d 718, 721 (1933).




The rules of respondeat superior have full play in considering lia-
bility of the dentist for the torts of his office staff. 1 The nation's out-
standing authority on dental jurisprudence voices the following warning:
A substantial number of cases fall within this category [of injury to
the patient by an office assistant who is working with the dentist]. The
great variety of incidents by which a patient is injured by act of a nurse
or other assistant in close proximity to the dentist are suggested by these
few: burns by spilling hot water, from modelling compounds and con-
tact with electrical equipment; a bottle containing a wrong solution or
compound is handed to and used by the dentist; and infection follows
abrasion from an instrument. 2
If a dentist follows the commendable practice of calling in a physician
to assist him in an especially difficult or hazardous operation, and if,
during the performance of that operation, the assisting physician com-
mits some act of negligence, the dentist will not have the negligence of
the physician imputed to him on the theory that they are joint enter-
prisers, at least so long as the doctor's negligence was not in the perform-
ance of a task which is peculiarly dental in nature." A purported reason
for this rule (which does not seem to support it) is that the dentist, who
is, after all, with reference to the entire medical profession, a sort of
specialist, is not held to the same standard of care as is a physician.64
The problem of liability for negligent treatment by a subsequent
dentist, which treatment was made necessary by the negligence of the
defendant dentist, was considered in a recent Virginia case."5 The de-
fendant refused to extract a root that he had left in plaintiff's gum. After
the subsequent tortfeasor removed the root, he negligently sewed up ab-
sorbent cotton in the incision. The court held that although a defendant
is liable for the foreseeable negligence of another who treats the injury
caused by him as original tort-feasor, the negligence of the second dentist
was so gross that it could not reasonably be anticipated in the present
state of medical science.6" The court did not bother to disclose the
criteria by which the act of the subsequent tort-feasor was determined
to be gross negligence.
61. See Comeaux v. Miles, 9 la. App. 66, 118 So. 786 (1928).
62. CARNAHAN, THE Dms'rsT AND -ma LAw § 144, at 207 (1955).
63. See Nelson v. Sandell, 202 Iowa 109, 114-16, 209 N.W. 440, 443-44 (1926). See also
Annot, 46 A.L. 1454 (1927).
64. Nelson v. Sandell, 202 Iowa 108, 114-16, 209 N.W. 440, 443-44 (1926).
65. Corbett v. Clarke, 187 Va. 222, 46 S.E.2d 327 (1948).
66. Id. at 226-27, 46 S.E.2d 327 at 329.
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The Unlicensed Practitioner
The authorities are split as to whether it is negligence per se to prac-
tice dentistry without a license. 7 Where the negligence per se concept
is applied, any damage which proximately results from injury to the pa-
tient by an unlicensed dentist, even though such injury is purely acci-
dental, may be recovered from the practitioner." In a recent, particu-
larly dissatisfying case, the decedent went to a dentist to have her three
remaining snags (stumps of teeth) removed. The snags were causing
decedent considerable pain, so she finally succumbed to an invitation by
the wife of the absent dentist, a woman who had had no dental training
whatsover, to be seated and allow defendant-wife to perform the extrac-
tions. Decedent thereafter suffered extreme agony from the pain in
her mouth. Four days after the operation she was observed to have
a bad case of trench mouth. In a couple of weeks she died of advanced
nephritis. Plaintiff was held to have been properly nonsuited in an
action for wrongful death and survival. The North Carolina Supreme
Court held69 that practicing dentistry without a license is not negligence
per se;7° that an unlicensed practitioner is held to the same standard as a
licensed one;7 that plaintiff's evidence of negligence was purely conjec-
tural; 2 and that there was no evidence that defendant's lack of knowl-
edge and skill was the proximate cause of decedent's injury because, al-
though trained dentists do know that it is dangerous to perform an ex-
traction while the patient is suffering from trench mouth, there was no
proof of the existence of trench mouth at the time of the extraction." If
application of the doctrine of negligence per se will tend to the produc-
tion of more equitable results than were achieved in the case just de-
scribed, the author favors its invocation.
The Statute of Limitations
An excellent reason for immediately revealing to the patient any un-
toward results of the extraction is the possibility that the statute of limita-
tions will not begin to run until the patient is informed of the alleged
negligence which has caused him damage. By his silence the dentist
commits constructive fraud and breaches a sacred duty which may readily
be analogized to a fiduicary duty of revelation. One dentist left con-
siderable scrap metal in a patient's jaw - a needle point and part of a
67. Compare Joly v. Mellor, 163 Wash. 48, 51-52, 299 Pac. 660, 661 (1931), with Grier v.
Phillips, 230 N.C. 672, 678, 55 S.E.2d 485, 490 (1949).
68. See Joly v. Mellor, 163 Wash. 48, 51-52, 299 Pac. 660, 661 (1931).
69. Grier v. Phillips, 230 N.C. 672, 55 S.E.2d 485 (1949).
70. Id. at 678, 55 S.E.2d at 490.
71. Id. at 679, 55 S.E.2d at 490.
72. Ibid.
73. Id. at 679-80, 55 S.E.2d at 491.
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drill - but was generous enough to hand plaintiff the x rays which he
took after the operation. This reticent operator prevented the statute of
limitations from running for seven years until another dentist discovered
plaintiff's difficulty. 4
The suit-saving nature of the efficient employment of the dentist's
x-ray apparatus appears again in this area. A dentist who left a root
in his patient's gum for one year without knowing it, was held to have
committed a continuing tort, for which the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until the last treatment, because it could be presumed that
an x ray would have led to correct diagnosis.
Miscellaneous
A few additional hints as to the legal duty of a dentist may be de-
rived from consideration of some unusual incidents that have occurred in
connection with extraction operations. In one case a patient was left
sitting in the dentist chair after two extractions, still under the influence
of nitrous oxide and in the charge of a nurse who had had no special
training in the care of persons who were in such a condition. The pa-
tient slumped forward and broke out of defendant's office by way of his
plate glass window. The court held that there was evidence for the jury
of negligence in leaving plaintiff with such an unskilled companion."m
In another case the New York Court of Appeals has recently decided77
that there is no evidence of negligence for the jury when the chorda tym-
pani and lingual nerve were discovered to be in a severed state after an
extraction, since the plaintiff had no evidence that the operation was per-
formed in a negligent manner. When another dentist was sued for
severing the inferior dental nerve, the patient was more fortunate. It was
alleged, and, indeed, it was admitted by defendant that there was a pro-
fuse flow of blood which somewhat obscured the operative field. The
court removed some of the obscurity in the field of malpractice by the
following explication:
The negligence involved is not the adoption of an incorrect diag-
nosis or standard of treatment, but, having adopted a proper standard of
treatment, consists in the performance thereof in a negligent manner.
In such a case any pertinent evidence having any fair tendency to sus-
tain the charge of negligence will be sufficient to take the question to
the jury.78
Such "pertinent evidence" was found to have existed.
74. Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 35-36, 198 P.2d 590, 595-96 (1948); Acton v. Mor-
rison, 62 Ariz. 139, 143-45, 155 P.2d 782, 783-84 (1945).
75. Hotelling v. Walther, 169 Ore. 559, 130 P.2d 944 (1942).
76. Langis v. Danforth, 308 Mass. 508, 33 N.B.2d 287 (1941).
77. Cassano v. Hagstrom, 5 N.Y.2d 643, 159 N.E.2d 348, 187 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1959).
78. Daly V. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 407, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930).
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Finding and understanding the law in the area of dental extractions is
not nearly so difficult as proving one's case against a particular defend-
ant dentist. To understand the proof phase of the case is of importance
not only to the attorney for the patient, but also to the dentist, in that
the latter can avoid some of the hazards that lead to a successful mal-




Ordinarily, the plaintiff in a malpractice case involving an extraction
must have expert testimony to support his allegations of negligence and
of proximate causation before he can bring his problem to the jury for
consideration.79 The expert is needed to inform the jury of the custom
in the defendant's professional community or neighborhood" and to
apply the standards of the profession to the facts. From this the jury can
determine whether the defendant violated his duty.
The expert need not be a dentist to qualify as an expert witness if
he is a member of the medical profession who is purported to have
knowledge of the anatomy of the mouth."' However, a physician who
examined x rays taken by defendant dentist was not entitled to interpret
those x rays on trial for the purpose of establishing that the x rays were
so unclear that defendant could not operate safely upon the basis of the
information contained in them. " In support of this decision, it may be
noted that a physician who is requested to interpret x rays as an expert is
likely to have significantly greater skill than the average dentist in
evaluating x rays, and the dentist should not be held to a high standard
of excellence in this phase of his employment unless he holds himself
out as an x-ray specialist.
In many of the few malpractice actions in which the patient has met
with success, a careful reading of the opinion indicates that plaintiff was
assisted and guided by a physician or dentist who later appeared at the
79. Haliburton v. General Hosp. Soc., 133 Conn. 61, 48 A.2d 261 (1946); Frogge v. Shug-
rue, 126 Conn. 608, 613, 13 A.2d 503, 504 (1940); Person v. Lilliendahl, 118 Coon. 693,
172 Ad. 94 (1934); Chubb v. Holmes, 111 Conn. 482, 487, 150 At. 516, 518-19 (1930);
Rawleigh v. Donoho, 238 Ky. 480, 484-85, 38 S.W.2d 227, 228-29 (1931); Borysewicz v.
Dineen, 302 Mass. 461, 19 N.E.2d 540 (1939); April v. Peront, 88 N.H. 309, 188 Ad. 457
(1936); Bierstein v. Whitman, 360 Pa. 537, 62 A.2d 843 (1949); Devereaux v. Smith, 213
S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1948).
80. See Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal. App. 404, 408, 3 P.2d 1023, 1025 (1931); Nemer v.
Green, 316 Mich. 307, 25 N.W.2d 207 (1946).
81. Hoskinson v. Smyser, 95 Kan. 568, 148 Pac. 640 (1915).
82. Rawleigh v. Donoho, 238 Ky. 480, 482, 38 S.W.2d 227-28 (1931).
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trial as a witness for plaintiff.83 On the other hand, it is a rare case in-
deed in which the plaintiff's expert was eager or even co-operative. One
authority" observes that the dental profession has not yet developed the
professional expert witness, who is willing to testify for any patient at
any time if plaintiff's attorney makes it worth his while. This shortage
of co-operative witnesses may be corrected, fortunately for the patient
with a meritorious claim, by the growth of specialized fields of dental
practice. Specialists, with their superior knowledge of certain aspects
of practice, are tempted to comment upon the work, within their peculiar
fields of knowledge, previously performed upon their patients by general
practitioners. The best way for the general practitioner to avoid having
a specialist make adverse comments upon his work is to reveal to his
patient any errors that he has made and to explain the procedure of prior
operations thoroughly to the specialist upon referrring a patient to him.8"
If the specialist is aware of past procedure, he may not be critical of bad
results, or at least he will not voice this criticism to the patient and plant
the seeds of a malpractice suit in which he will be requested to appear as
plaintiff's expert witness.
Exceptions to Requirement of Expert Testimony
To compensate for the shortages of professional co-operation, the
courts have developed certain exceptions to the rule requiring expert testi-
mony to sustain plaintiff's burden of proof. These exceptions will now
be considered in detail.
1. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The plaintiff has a substitute for the facts constituting the alleged
acts of negligence, which are not easily accessible to him, so he is freed
from the duty to plead the acts of negligence of the defendant, which
under the circumstances would be little more than blind guesswork.86
The preceding is what one authority has to say on one small aspect of the
usefulness of the inference raised by res ipsa loquitur in dental cases.
When res ipsa loquitur is an available doctrine, there is no need for the
plaintiff to put forth expert testimony to sustain his burden of proof; for
83. See, e.g., Staples v. Washington, 125 A.2d 322 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1956); Bridge-
water v. Boyles, 107 NXE.2d 641 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951); Malila v. Meacham, 187 Ore. 330,
211 P.2d 747 (1949).
84. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATTNr AND THE LAW 476-77 (3d ed. 1956).
85. Boyko, Legal Dental Responsibilities in Malpractice Suits, 28 J. OF THE N.J.S. DENTAL
SoclY 22 (1957).
86. Arthur, Res Ipsa Loquitar as Applied it Dental Cases, 15 ROCKY MT. L. Ry. 220, 234
(1943).
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when "the thing speaks for itself," the plaintiff is assured that the jury
will consider his case.a'
The first case88 to apply the rule to a dental extraction was decided in
1882; significantly this was also the first American malpractice case in-
volving a dental extraction. A lower tooth lodged in plaintiff's bronchial
tubes while he was under the influence of nitrous oxide. Citing Byrne v.
Boadle,9 the case in which res ipsa loquitur was first applied, the court
held that the event's occurrence was sufficient to make out a prima facie
case of negligence for the jury." The leading case on malpractice haz-
ards in dental extractions, Whetstine v. Moravec,"' also a tooth-in-the-
lung affair, applied res ipsa loquitor.
It is common knowledge that, in extracting a tooth or its root,
neither ordinarily passes into the trachea and thus into the lungs. In fact
such an occurrence is most rare. In the words of the authorities it is a
matter of such rare occurrence and unusual character, that its very hap-
pening carries with it a strong inherent possibility of negligence.93
A brief scrutiny of the above test indicates that res ipsa does not ordinarily
apply to cases of malpractice, any more than it ordinarily applies to the
usual negligence action. A few courts hold that res ipsa loquitur never
applies to a malpractice action because the medical sciences are not in
such an advanced state that the common experience of mankind contra-
indicates careful procedure when an unfortunate result arises from treat-
ment by a dentist." Some base the exclusion of the theory in these cases
on the ground that a dentist does not guarantee good results. 5 Where
res ipsa loquitur is employed at all to relieve plaintiff of his burden, it
seems to be limited to injuries not connected with the peculiar dangers
involved in the operation in question." Thus, the fracture of a tooth
87. PRossnR, TORTS § 43, at 212 (1955).
88. Keily v. Colton, I City Ct. Rep. 439 (N.Y. Marine Ct. 1882).
89. 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
90. Kelly v. Colton, 1 City Ct. Rep. 439, 441-42 (N.Y. Marine Ct. 1882).
91. 228 Iowa 352, 291 N.W. 425 (1940).
92. Id. at 365-66, 291 N.W. at 434.
93. Id. at 373, 291 N.W. at 435.
94. See Adams v. Heffington, 216 Ark. 534, 535, 226 S.W.2d 352 (1950) (dictum); cf.
Haliburton v. General Hosp. Soc., 133 Conn. 61, 48 A.2d 261 (1946); Donoho v. Rawleigh,
230 Ky. 11, 15, 18 S.W.2d 311, 312 (1929).
95. See Malila v. Meacham, 187 Ore. 330, 354-55, 211 P.2d 747, 757 (1949); cf. Frogge v.
Shugrue, 126 Conn. 608, 613, 13 A.2d 503, 504-05 (1940); Chubb v. Holmes, 111 Conn.
482, 489, 150 Adt. 516, 519 (1930).
96. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Friedman, 158 Misc. 656, 657-58, 286 N.Y. Supp. 118, 121 (N.Y.
City Ct., Trial T. 1936), which the author is wont to call the Testicles Case. It seems that
patient, going through the "fighting stage" of nitrous oxide, grasped defendant's private parts
with a powerful and tenacious grip. Defendant broke plaintiff's pinky in releasing her hold.
The court staidly applied res ipsa loquitur, and required defendant to satisfactorily explain
how such an event could occur, a monumental task indeed! Cf. Pepin v. Averill, 113 Vt. 212,
216, 32 A.2d 665, 668 (1943).
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outside the operative field, 7 the dropping of a tooth into the trachea,"8
and the breaking of a needle in the patient's jaw"° create inferences of
negligence. The breaking off of a tooth which is being extracted"' or
the fracturing of a patient's jaw.1 do not imply negligence.
Although the problem has received scant consideration, the amount
of control which the dentist has over the instruments which he employs
and over the reactions of the patient should be an important factor to be
analyzed in determining whether res ipsa loquitur applies.0 2 One court
has held' that the dentist who is performing an extraction is not in
complete control of the tooth, but is merely attempting to gain control.
On the foundation of this observation the court refused to hold res ipsa
loquitur to be available when the extracted tooth and some of its filling
fell down plaintiff's throat while she was under general anesthetic.
A few courts, without applying res ipsa loquitur by name, have em-
ployed other inferences of negligence, such as common knowledge,'
common sense,0 5 or judicial notice. 0 All of these are devices for help-
ing plaintiff to make out a prima facie case, and they differ from res
ipsa loquitur only in name.
2. Admissions Against Interest
Although they have seldom been sufficient in and of themselves to
send malpractice cases to the jury,' admissions against interest often
have been considered sufficient evidence to alleviate the burden of intro-
ducing expert testimony.' Such declarations, after all, make the de-
fendant-dentist the expert witness of the patient pro hac vice. In a classic
example of a dentist's over-exercise of his own jaw muscles, after jam-
ming the needle angrily into plaintiff's jaw and breaking it off, the den-
97. Ambrosi v. Monksa, 85 A.2d 188, 190 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1951).
98. Whetstine v. Moravec, 228 Iowa 352, 365-66, 291 N.W. 425, 434 (1940); Kelly v.
Colton, 1 City Ct. Rep. 439, 441-42 (N.Y. Marine Ct. 1882). Contra, Bollenbach v. Bloom-
enthal, 341 Ill. 539, 544, 173 NE. 670, 672 (1930).
99. Alonzo v. Rogers, 155 Wash. 206, 210-12, 283 Pac. 709, 710-11 (1930).
100. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
101. Hill v. Jackson, 218 Mo. App. 210, 215, 265 S.W. 859, 861 (1924); Francis v. Brooks,
24 Ohio App. 136, 156 N.E. 609 (1926) (dictum).
102. PROSSER, TORTs § 42, at 205 (1955).
103. Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 M. 539, 544, 173 N.E. 670, 672 (1930).
104. See Mastro v. Kennedy, 57 Cal. App. 2d 499, 504, 134 P.2d 865, 868 (1943); Am-
brosi v. Monksa, 85 A.2d 188, 190 (D.C. Mumic. Ct. App. 1951).
105. See Hill v. Jackson, 218 Mo. App. 210, 216-17, 265 S.W. 859, 862 (1924); Bode v.
Robeson, 31 OHIo L. REP. 608 (Cr. App. 1930).
106. See Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206, 216, 291 Pac. 173, 177 (1930).
107. But see Tully v. Mandell, 269 Mass. 307, 309, 168 NE. 923 (1929).
108. See Whetstine v. Moravec, 228 Iowa 352, 360, 291 N.W. 425, 429 (1940); loveland
v. Nelson, 235 Mich. 623, 626, 209 N.W. 835, 836 (1926); Lydamore v. Foote, 251 App.
Div. 775, 295 N. Y. Supp. 608 (3d Dep't 1937); Pepin v. Averill, 113 Vt. 212, 32 A.2d
665 (1943).
1960] NOTES
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tist growled: "I guess I will quit this damn business and go to plumb-
ing." ' The wise dentist will avoid spontaneous, unguarded exclamations
of surprise, grief, or anger, as well as those of error. The mistake ad-
mitted, of course, is not legally significant unless it is synonymous with
negligent operation, as opposed to mere error of judgment in diagnosis."'
(The admission will be legally significant under all circumstances, how-
ever, in those jurisdictions in which there is liability for error of judg-
ment in diagnosis.)
3. Facts Comprehensible by a Layman
In several jurisdictions it has been decided that when the facts are of
such a non-technical nature that they can be clearly comprehended by the
average layman, there is no necessity for plaintiff to produce expert
opinion testimony in order to establish a prima facie case."' The dear
reason for this exception to the rule requiring such testimony is the re-
luctance of professionals to testify against their brother-practitioners."
Under this exception, a plaintiff was allowed to testify that the de-
fendant held the hypodermic needle in plaintiff's jaw for only two to four
seconds."' The exception has also been applied to the tooth-in-the-
lung situation," 4 to the fracturing of a sound jaw," 5 and to injury caused
by the stubbornness and discourtesy of the dentist."'
Since the exception based on facts within the knowledge of laymen
is quite malleable, it may grow to an extent adequate to dissolve the rule
requiring expert testimony if the profession continues to refrain from
providing our courts with the benefit of their knowledge of professional
standards.
Establishing Proximate Causation
In malpractice cases involving dental extractions, it is unusually diffi-
cult to prove proximate causation. The problem arises not in establishing
the extent to which a defendant will be held liable for the results of his
109. Bode v. Robeson, 31 OHIo L. REP. 608 (Ct. App. 1930).
110. Walter v. England, 133 Cal. App. 676, 686-87, 24 P.2d 930, 934 (1933).
111. Id. at 686, 689-90, 24 P.2d at 933, 935; Nelson v. Parker, 104 Cal. App. 770, 776,
286 Pac. 1078, 1081 (1930); Steinke v. Bell, 32 N.J. Super. 67, 70, 107 A.2d 825, 826
(Super. Ct. 1954); Bode v. Robeson, 31 OHIo L REP. 608 (Ct. App. 1930); Francis v.
Brooks, 24 Ohio App. 136, 141-43, 156 N.E. 609, 611 (1926); Hill v. Parker, 12 Wash. 2d
517, 529, 122 P.2d 476, 482 (1942).
112. See Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1956).
113. Walter v. England, 133 Cal. App. 676, 686, 689-90, 24 P.2d 930, 933, 935 (1933).
114. Nelson v. Parker, 104 Cal. App. 770, 776, 286 Pac. 1078, 1081 (1930); Malone v.
Bianchi, 318 Mass. 179, 61 N.E.2d 1 (1945); Toy v. Mackintosh, 222 Mass. 430, 432, 110
N.E. 1034, 1035 (1916).
115. Wambold v. Brock, 236 Iowa 758, 19 N.W.2d 582 (1945).
116. Bode v. Robeson, 31 OHIo L. REP. 608 (Ct. App. 1930).
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negligent acts, but in proving that it was this defendant who caused the
injury, or that the injury would not have occurred absent his negligence
- in other words, cause in fact. Where, for example, the patient suffers
from a mouth infection after the operation, the infection could have
been caused (with nearly equal probability) by mouth organisms na-
turally present,"' by the activation of a dormant diseased condition,"' or
by the use of unclean instruments."' It is not sufficient for purposes of
sustaining the patient's burden of proof to establish equal probabilities.
The patient would be aided by showing that he has seen no other dentist
but defendant prior to the injury.2
So long as there is not an equal probability that another cause pro-
duced the injury, the patient need not exclude every other possible
cause.' 2' For example, illness after an extraction, and subsidence of ill-
ness once pieces of metal that had been left in the jaw were removed,
should be considered to be more than coincidence, so that the jury could
find that the illness was caused by the negligence of defendant in leav-
ing the metal in plaintiff's gums. "  Nor need proximate causation be
proved with absolute certainty, because the courts are willing to recog-
nize that in the present state of medical science the beginnings of disease
are often obscure.' One court felicitously stated the degree of certainty
in causation which must appear in plaintiff's evidence before the case can
reach the jury to be as follows:
The defendant, by his testimony, contradicted the plaintiff on all
points imputing negligence. What were the exact facts we do not
know nor have we power to decide. That was the sole function of the
jury, and their decision is final if based on sufficient evidence. The
jury could, if they saw proper, reject the evidence of prior infection, and
they could find, as they did, that the disease was occasioned by negli-
gence of the defendant in the operations and treatment if the evidence
was sufficient. That evidence need not be direct; it need only be cir-
cumstantial and is enough if it develops permissible inferences of the
fact. Of course no one, doubtless not even the defendant, saw the
periosteum, and consequently no one knows certainly whether it was in-
jured by the dental instruments; but from the obstinacy of the tooth,
the difficulty of extraction, the repeated attempts to extract it, the power
applied, the injury to the hand of the operator, the consequent pain and
pus in the jaw, there was enough evidence to support a finding that the
117. See Frechev. Mary, 16 So. 2d 213 (La. Ct. App. 1944).
118. See Shober v. McKeag, 16 Ohio Dec. 373, 375 (Super. Ct. 1905), afl'd per curiam, 76
Ohio St. 610, 81 N.E. 1190 (1907).
119. See Traverse v. Wing, 256 Mass. 320, 162 N.E. 354 (1926).
120. See Honaker v. Whitley, 124 Va. 194, 97 S.E. 808 (1919).
121. Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 32-33, 198 P.2d 590, 593-94 (1948); Roberts v.
Parker, 121 Cal. App. 264, 8 P.2d 908 (1932); Ambrosi v. Monksa, 85 A.2d 188, 189 (D.C.
Munic. Ct. App. 1951); Whetstine v. Moravec, 228 Iowa 352, 361-62, 291 N.W. 425, 430-31
(1940).
122. Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 32-33, 198 P.2d 590, 593-94 (1948).
123. See Roberts v. Parker, 121 Cal. App. 264, 8 P.2d 908 (1932).
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periosteum had been injured during the operations; and upon the con-
tention that the wound was not properly treated and the offending tooth
was not properly removed, there was enough evidence to justify the
jury in finding that osteomyelitis developed after the operation, that it
was the sole and proximate result of an injury to the periosteum and
that the injury to the periosteum was proximately caused by negligence
in the extraction of the tooth and in lack of treatment of the wound' 2 4
This court allowed the jury to infer that the infection was caused by in-
jury to the periosteum (bone layer), and from this inference to infer
that the periosteum was injured by defendant's negligence. Not all
courts, needless to say, have held such circumstantial evidence to be suf-
ficient to make out a prima facie case. 5
If expert testimony is necessary to establish negligence, it is dearly
necessary to prove the complicated issues of proximate causation.2 Al-
though the issue of proximate cause is generally held to be one for the
jury to decide, a jury's verdict on this point in a malpractice suit is not
likely to be as binding upon a reviewing court as such verdict would be
in other negligence actions, because the inference of causation is based
upon expert opinion testimony rather than on factual testimony."
Because of the difficult problems of proof with respect to the issue of
cause in fact, the advisability of each person's maintaining a single dentist
should be clear. It is illustrated by the following syllabus from the
Southeastern Reporter:
In an action against a dentist for malpractice, where it appeared that
plaintiff, who had consulted defendant and then another dentist, suf-
fered a fractured jaw as a result of the treatment of one or another, evi-
dence held unsufficient [sic] to establish that defendant fractured plain-
tiff's jaw, so as to warrant judgment against him. 28
One need not be litigious-minded to heed the warning above.
Damages
Relatively fewer malpractice claims involve dentists than physicians;
and, of course, catastrophic injury cases are infrequent in the field of
dentistry. Nevertheless, malpractice claims against dentists are increas-
ing in number and many judgments in considerable amounts are being
recovered.' 2
9
Damages which naturally flow from the defendant's malpractice are re-
coverable. For example, when, as a result of the negligent fracture of
124. Bumberger v. Burke, 56 F.2d 54, 56 (3d Cir. 1932).
125. See Donathan v. McConnell, 121 Mont. 230, 239-40, 193 P.2d 819, 824 (1948).
126. See Hurley v. Johnston, 143 Conn. 364, 122 A.2d 732 (1956); Devereaux v. Smith,
213 S.W. 2d 170 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1948); Honaker v. Whitley, 124 Va. 194, 97 S.E. 808
(1919); Lindloff v. Ross, 208 Wis. 482, 488-89, 243 N.W. 403, 405 (1932); Krueger v.
Chase, 172 Wis. 163, 168-69, 177 N.W. 510, 512 (1920).
127. See Id. at 168, 177 N.W. at 512.
128. Honaker v. Whitley, 124 Va. 194, 97 S.E. 808 (1919).
129. REGAN, DocTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAw 476 (3d ed. 1956).
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plaintiff's jaw, followed by a negligent setting of the broken jawbone by
defendant, plaintiff was able to open her mouth no wider than the thick-
ness of a pencil and could not chew her food, the latter condition could
properly be considered by the jury in fixing damages.' Certainty of
the measure and extent of damages equal to the certainty of negligence
and proximate causation need not and should not, out of fairness to aninnocent plaintiff, be necessary. Especially is this true in dental mal-
practice cases, for the dentist has a duty to treat the patient without
negligence so as to decrease the danger of suffering and increase the
chances of comfort and health. 1 Unless there is willful and gross mis-
conduct, punitive damages are not allowed. 32 To allow them in the
ordinary malpractice suit would come dangerously close to making the
dentist an insurer of good results, not to mention the deleterious effect
the frequent recovery of punitive damages would have on professional
morale.
TECHNICAL ASSAULT
Since the courts have become used to conceiving of "malpractice" as
being synonymous with "negligence," a suit for battery for extraction of
a tooth not specified before the operation is not considered to be a suit
for malpractice.' 3 This bit of judicial labeling ordinarily has no more
effect than to preclude application of the peculiar negligence doctrines,
such as the requirement of expert testimony and the establishment of
breach of duty and proximate cause. Negligence has nothing to do
with this action for battery (commonly called "technical assault," proba-
bly because it is not reasonably possible for there to be genuine appre-
hension of the non-consensual operation). It seems, however, that
merely by inserting the proper words in his petition, plaintiff has an op-
tion of bringing the suit as one for malpractice. 34 Courts have adopted
this liberality to save plaintiffs from being barred by the shorter statutes
of limitations for assault and battery."3 5 Some courts indicate that in
alleging extraction of a healthy tooth, plaintiff alleges at least negligence,
and proving the fact should make out at least a prima fade case of neg-
ligence.1
36
130. Francis v. Brooks, 24 Ohio App. 136, 156 NE. 609 (Ct. App. 1926).
131. Voss v. Adams, 271 Mich 203, 205-06, 259 N.W. 889, 890 (1935).
132. Eatley v. Mayer, 9 N.J. Misc. 918, 154 Ad. 10 (Cir. Ct. 1931), af'd on other grounds,
10 N.J. Misc. 219, 158 Ad. 411 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
133. See, e.g., Ober v. Hollinger, 14 Ohio L. Abs. 514 (Ct. App. 1933).
134. See Hershey v. Peake, 115 Kan. 562, 223 Pac. 1113 (1924); McClees v. Cohen, 158
Md. 60, 64, 148 Ad. 124, 125-26 (1930).
135. See ibid.; Hershey v. Peake, 115 Kan. 562, 223 Pac. 1113 (1924); Francis v. Brooks,
24 Ohio App. 136, 143-44, 156 N.E. 609, 612 (1926) (dictum).
136. See Griffen v. Norman, 192 N.Y. Supp. 322, 323 (App. T., 1st Dep't 1922); Krom-
poltz v. Hyman, 70 Pa. Super, 581, 582 (1919).
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Absent an emergency, the dentist may not go beyond the implied
contract of treatment unless, perhaps, the agreement is that the dentist
may perform an exploratory operation, and the dentist discovers an un-
anticipated cause of the illness for which plaintiff sought a cure." 7 One
dentist has recently commented on the problem just posed:
The impracticality of waking a patient, explaining to him the change
of procedure for the operation, and placing him under the anesthetic
again, has been accepted only to a limited extent. For this reason hos-
pitals and surgeons make extensive use of written waivers.138
Without the obstructions to reaching the jury that exist in a negli-
gence action, the suit for technical assault may cause little difficulty in
making out a prima facie case. The bare testimony of plaintiff that
defendant was not authorized to extract the tooth in question, although
contradicted by defendant and his office assistants, is sufficient to send
the case to the jury."9 Paradoxically, the intent of the patient may be a
factor necessary to establish just what it was that he consented to. The
following excerpt illustrates the issue:
It would be consistent with the dentist's testimony that he meant or
indicated the two lower molars when he said, 'These two have got to
come out," but it is a question of fact for the jury whether the plaintiff
went to the dentist because she was suffering pain from her teeth gen-
erally and submitted to his judgment, or went there to have two roots
extracted, and in violation of her instructions and without her consent
he pulled two lower teeth instead. If the former, he was entitled to a
verdict; if the latter, she was.140
Appreciation of the plight of the dentist when technical assault is alleged
led to bad law in Doniger v. Berger.4' The defendant was a professor of
oral surgery to whom plaintiff's family dentist sent her for a removal of
a first molar. Defendant, however, made his own independent diagnosis
and determined that it was the second molar which was causing the
difficulty. He removed the second molar, and plaintiff suffered no fur-
ther pain. (In fact, her first molar was still intact at the time of trial.)
When plaintiff recovered from the general anesthetic, she complained
that the defendant had removed the wrong tooth, which he learned to
be so upon telephoning the family dentist. Judgment for plantiff in a
trial without jury was reversed and the case was remanded for new trial
on the theory that defendant had the right to make an independent diag-
nosis and to remove the tooth which he believed was causing the diffi-
culty. Defendant should not be punished, said the court, for a job well
137. See Ober v. Hollinger, 14 Ohio L. Abs. 514 (Ct. App. 1933).
138. Streem, Standards of Care in Dentistry, 9 CLEvB.-MAI. L. REv. 154, 158 (1960).
139. Throne v. Wandell, 176 Wis. 97, 186 N.W. 146 (1922).
140. McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 66-67, 148 Ad. 124, 127 (1930).
141. 241 App. Div. 23, 271 N.Y. Supp. 30 (1st Dep't 1934).
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done. As the dissenting opinion 42 explicates, every competent adult has
the right to use his body as he will. The majority allowed a far-from-
urgent end to justify a less-than-moral means.
CONCLUSION
Little profundity is prerequisite to a conclusion that the expert wit-
ness is the most vital figure in any malpractice action. For this reason,
the author has chosen to relate his concluding remarks to the subject
of the expert witness - his importance, his testimony, and how he can
make the law more just and the dental profession more appreciated.
The expert is essential to successful results by the parties to a suit involv-
ing an extraction. He is the dental profession's public relations repre-
sentative. He informs the public, through the medium of a public
trial, precisely how high the standards of his profession are. His testi-
mony is an indirect method of removing from the practice of dentistry
those who are not fit to engage in it, but he never passes judgment upon
the acts of the particular defendant."4 3 The sole role of the expert
witness is to vindicate the standards and ethics of the dental profession.
To do so is not to lower himself into the arena of legal contest, but to
elevate himself to the position of a patient-minded minister of the dent-
istry Gospel. Self-interest requires nothing less. 44
On the other hand, when deserving and innocent patients do not
recover upon meritorious claims because of a lack of co-operation from
the dental profession, hard cases will continue to make bad law. The
scope of the exceptions to the rule requiring expert opinion testimony
to make out a prima facie case can easily be expanded. Evidence necessary
to show proximate cause may be made less and less direct. Over-cautious
and therefore inadequate treatment is bound to arise as long as dentists
are fearful of their legal liability. Fear of liability, in turn, arises from
uncertainty as to the state of the law. Vacillation in malpractice law,
therefore, cannot avoid harming professional standards; and vacillation
is correlated to frustration of legal procedures by lack of co-operation
from the dental profession in the form of expert testimony. Thus, the
expert witness serves as the buffer between maladjustment in the law of
malpractice and the sound performance of dental operations. When the
legal principles accord with the realities of practice, society will be the
victor in each and every lawsuit.
ALAN ARNOLD
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